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Recent Decisions
FEDERAL COURTS-DOGTRINE OF ABSTENTION-The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has held that the
court need not abstain from approving a consent agreement between
the Commonwealth and the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children, although the statutes challenged under the equal protection
clause and under state law were unclear.
The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsyl-
vania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of mentally retarded per-
sons between the ages of six and twenty-one, alleging that four Penn-
sylvania statutes violated the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution by
excluding certain retarded persons from the public school system.' It
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1304 (Supp. 1973) provides:
... [T]he board of school directors may refuse to accept or retain beginners who have
not attained a mental age of five years ....
Id. § 13-1326 (1962) provides:
The term "compulsory school age", as hereafter used, shall mean the period of a
child's life from the time the child's parents elect to have the child enter school, which
shall not be later than the age of eight (8) years, until the age of seventeen (17) years.
Id. § 13-1330 (Supp. 1973) provides:
The provisions of this act requiring regular attendance shall not apply to any child
who . . . (2) Has been examined by an approved mental clinic or by a person certified
as a public school psychologist or psychological examiner, and has been found to be
unable to profit from further public school attendance, and who has been reported to
the board of school directors and excused, in accordance with the regulations pre-
scribed by the State Board of Education.
Id. § 13-1375 provides:
The State Board of Education shall establish standards for temporary or permanent
exclusion from the public schools of children who are found to be uneducable and
untrainable in the public schools. Any child who is reported by a person who is certi-
fied as a public school psychologist as being uneducable and untrainable in the public
schools, may be reported by the board of school directors to the Superintendent of
Public Instruction and when approved by him, in accordance with the standards of
the State Board of Education, shall be certified to the Department of Public Welfare
as a child who is uneducable and untrainable in the public schools. When a child is
thus certified, the public schools shall be relieved of the obligation of providing edu-
cation or training for such child. The Department of Public Welfare shall thereupon
arrange for the care, training and supervision of such child in a manner not incon-
sistent with the laws governing mentally defective individuals.
Plaintiffs alleged that sections 1375 and 1304 had constitutional infirmities both on their
faces and as applied because they lacked provision for notice and a hearing when a re-
tarded person was excluded from a public education or a change was made in his educa-
tional assignment in the system, thereby denying due process. Also, it was asserted that
equal protection was denied because the premise that certain retarded persons are unedu-
cable lacked a rational basis in fact. Finally, it was alleged that these two sections arbi-
trarily and capriciously denied a right to education to retarded children.
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was also argued that state law affords a right to a public education to
all children.2 Plaintiffs asked relief in the form of a declaratory judg-
ment stating that the statutes were unconstitutional. Further, a pre-
liminary and permanent injunction against the enforcement of these
laws by the defendants, the Commonwealth, and thirteen named school
districts was sought pursuant to sections 1343,3 19814 and 19835 of the
United States Code.
The parties submitted to the court a consent agreement which elim-:
inated a possible dispute between them in regard to the due process
and equal protection issues.6 In accordance with rule 23(e), 7 a hearing
It was also contended that sections 1330 and 1326 violated due process as applied to
retarded children. Plaintiffs argued that the intent of these sections was to refer to the
excusal of parents from criminal penalties and to the obligation of parents to place their
children in public schools respectively, not to exclude retarded children from the public
schools.
2. PA. CONsT. art. 3, § 14 provides:
The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough
and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1301 (1962) provides:
Every child, being a resident of any school district, between the ages of six (6) and
twenty-one (21) years, may attend the public schools in his district, subject to the
provisions of this act....
Id. § 13-1326 provides:
The term "compulsory school age" as hereinafter used, shall mean the period of a
child's life from the time the child's parents elect to have the child enter school, which
shall not be later than eight (8) years.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person ... (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of
any state law, statute, ordinance or regulation, custom or usage of any right, privilege
or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of
Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right In
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like pun-
ishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
5. Id. § 1983 provides:
Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
6. The Pennsylvania Ass'n For Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279,
284-88 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The unconstitutionality of the state law was not conceded by the
Attorney General, although it was agreed that the statutes would be construed in a man-
ner that would not obstruct the plaintiff class' access to public education.
7. FmD. R. Civ. P. 23(e) provides:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all mem-
bers of the class in such manner as the court directs.
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was scheduled on any objections to the proposed settlement agree-
ments. Several members of the defendant class objected to the settle-
ment agreement. However, after intensive negotiations between the
objectors and the proponents of the settlement only the Lancaster-
Lebanon Intermediate Unit (Lancaster-Lebanon) remained as a de-
fendant.8 All others withdrew their objections as subsequent modifica-
tions of the agreement satisfied their complaints. Lancaster-Lebanon,
however, sought to destroy the agreements altogether, not by contest-
ing the fairness of the settlement, but by raising the issues of jurisdic-
tion and abstention.
Although no party questioned the quality of the plaintiff's constitu-
tional claims, the court felt obligated to examine the record independ-
ently to satisfy itself that the claims raised were substantial. 9 The court
relied upon expert testimony 0 and the case of Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau," to hold that the danger of stigma without proper procedural
safeguards raised a colorable claim under the due process clause. Like-
wise, the court found a colorable claim under the equal protection
clause relying upon expert opinion that all mentally retarded persons
are capable of benefiting from education and training.12
The court held that it need not stay its hand until the Pennsylvania
courts decide whether the Pennsylvania constitution and laws of the
Commonwealth afforded plaintiffs relief. Preliminarily, it was found that
rule 23 precluded Lancaster-Lebanon from raising the issue of absten-
tion.13 However, finding that abstention involves important issues of
the relationship of the federal and state judiciaries the court decided
to entertain the defendant's contention.
The court reasoned that the doctrine of abstention has a twofold
8. 343 F. Supp. at 289.
9. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946) (plantiffs claims must not be wholly insub-
stantial and frivolous).
10. 343 F. Supp. at 293-96. (testimony of Dr. Ignacy Goldberg, summarized by the
court). Dr. Goldberg is, inter alia, Professor of Education, Department of Special Educa-
tion, Columbia University; member of the President's Panel on Mental Retardation (1961);
consultant to the Children's Bureau, Department of Health, Education and Walfare; Sci-
entific Advisory Board Member of the Kennedy Child Study Center, New York; and author
or co-author of almost fifty publications on mental retardation. Id. at 285 n.14a.
11. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
12. 343 F. Supp. at 296 nn.49-54.
13. Id. at 298. The court found that since the theory behind class actions assumes
that all members are bound by the legal strategy of the class's representatives, if the
representation is adequate, a member of the class is precluded from raising the issue of
abstention.
Also, the court stated that traditionally at a hearing on the proposed settlement of a
class action the issues are limited to the fairness of the proposed settlement or other issues
which expressly involve rule 23. Id.
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purpose: first, to avoid needless constitutional or premature constitu-
tional adjudication, and second, to avoid needless friction between the
state and federal governments. 14 It was also found that where state law
was not unclear, a federal court could not abstain.' 5
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that no consent agreement was
entered into, it was found that the statutes challenged under the due
process claim were clear and therefore abstention would not have been
required.'6 Thus, the court was left to decide whether it should abstain
on the issue of equal protection, 17 having found that the statutes chal-
lenged under this clause were unclear.' s Reasoning that the settlement
agreement eliminated the necessity of making a constitutional decision
at all and that no risk of federal-state friction was present,' 9 the court
held that abstention would not be proper and the case was retained.
20
Furthermore, considering the equitable nature of the abstention doc-
trine, it was concluded that equitable considerations militated against
abstaining.2'
Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 22 is generally recognized as
the leading case for the entire abstention doctrine. 23 Prior to that deci-
sion, however, the Supreme Court had made several decisions to abstain
when a difficult question of state law was presented which was unre-
solved by the state courts. 24 Nevertheless, the Pullman decision laid
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 299.
17. Id.
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1304, -1375 (Supp. 1973).
19. 343 F. Supp. at 299. The Attorney General, Secretary of Education, and Secretary
of Welfare, all affirmatively requested that the court retain jurisdiction. These officers are
those responsible for the state's system of education.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 300. Six hearings were held over the period of a year. International experts
in the field of education testified regarding the education of retarded children. Adminis-
trative and legal problems were reviewed by local experts. Thus, the court concluded
that the consent agreements were drawn by experts in the field and largely by the ex-
pertise of the Commonwealth, not a remote federal court.
Also, the court placed weight on the facts that many school districts had begun the task
of locating members of the plaintiff class. It also found that much time and energy was
expended in pursuance of the plan laid down by the consent agreement. The court felt
that with the plan on the way to becoming a reality it would serve no useful purpose to
abstain.
22. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman porters alleged that a state statute requiring all Pull-
man sleeping cars to be in the charge of an employee having the rank of "Pullman Con-
ductor" was in violation of the fourteenth amendment. At that time, pullman porters
were black and pullman conductors were white. Pullman porters were in charge of those
trains that carried only one sleeping car prior to the enactment of the statute.
23. Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered. 37 Tax. L. REv. 816 (1959).
24. Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940) (The Court
found that the administration of Texas statutes limiting and prorating the production of
oil fields was so complex that it would be presumptous to substitute the Court's view for
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the first significant foundation for what is known as the doctrine of
abstention.25 The Supreme Court in Pullman held that the issue of un-
constitutional discrimination should be withheld pending proceedings
in the state court to secure a definitive construction of the state statute
in question.28 The Court reasoned that an unnecessary constitutional
adjudication might be avoided by a definitive state ruling that would
terminate the controversy, 27 and also reasoned that the court would
avoid a decision that would only supply a tentative answer that might
be replaced by a state adjudication.28 Moreover, the Court defined the
doctrine of abstention as being an equitable one, subject to the court's
discretion.29 The Court further decided that it would exercise its dis-
cretion to avoid needless friction with state policies. 30 As a result of
the Pullman decision there have been many holdings of the Court re-
quiring abstention when the resolution of unsettled state law by a state
court was considered necessary to either eliminate or change the nature
of the consideration of a federal question.31
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,32 it was held that federal courts of equity
should exercise their discretionary powers with regard for the inde-
pendence of state governments in carrying out their policies.33 The
Burford opinion highlighted the Court's reluctance to interfere with
that of the administrative tribunal of the state and to find it offensive to the fourteenth
amendment); Gilchrest v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929) (a federal
court action to prevent the state commission from interfering with a fare increase. The
Court abstained, deferring to a state court action that was filed to compel compliance
with existing fares).
25. The abstention doctrine has been classified into four types: (1) to avoid decision of
a federal constitutional question where the case may be disposed of on questions of state
law, (2) to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a state of its own affairs,
(3) to leave to the states the resolution of unsettled questions of state law, and (4) to ease
the congestion of the federal court docket. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 196-208
(2d ed. 1970). This note is concerned only with the first three classifications of abstention.
26. 312 U.S. 496.
27. Id. at 500.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 501. In its discussion of the equitable nature of the abstention doctrine and
its relationship to our federal system of government, the Court stated that the federal
courts " '. .. exercising a wise descretion', restrain their authority because of 'scrupulous
regard for the rightful independence of the state governments' and for the smooth working
of the federal judiciary." Id. It therefore appears that the concept of comity has been
incorporated into the doctrine by way of the exercise of the federal courts' equity power.
30. Id. at 500.
.31. Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); United Gas Pipe Line Co.
v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962); City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 358
U.S. 639 (1959); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1963); Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944).
32. 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (the Court refused to enjoin an order of the State Railroad
Commission of Texas permitting the drilling of oil wells separated by distances less than
those generally prescribed, finding that this was a matter for state administration, given
the complexity of state regulation upon the matter).
33. Id.
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administrative policies that are of great importance to the state and,
in this respect, broadened the scope of the doctrine of abstention. 34
Thus, as its origins indicate, it is seen that the rationale for the doc-
trine is founded upon the avoidance of unnecessary or premature
constitutional adjudication, the avoidance of unnecessary friction in
federal-state relations and that this latter consideration carries much
weight where matters of local concern to the states are involved.35 This
rationale finds its basis in the broad concept of comity.3 6 Such a ration-
ale recognizes that the United States is a union of separate states and
attempts to delineate the functions of the state and federal govern-
ments so they may work in their separate ways. 37 This factor plays a
strong part in the decision of a federal court when it decides whether
or not to abstain.3
On the other hand, it has been indicated that abstention is not called
for when the state law is clear, even though state courts can compe-
tently decide the federal question involved,39 or when the state law is
clear and challenges to the state's paramount interests have been made
in the suit.40 The Supreme Court has also shown a reluctance to ab-
34. A further example of Burford reasoning is found in Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n
v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951). The Court found that regulation of intrastate rail-
road service was a matter to be handled by the appropriate state agency for it has been
recognized that such regulation is primarily the concern of the state. Thus, the Court
ordered dismissal of the complaint stating that adequate state court review of an admin-
istrative order based upon predominantly local factors was available and therefore federal
intervention was not needed to protect federal rights.
35. For extensive analysis of the abstention doctrine see Comment, The Abstention
Doctrine, 40 TUL. L. REv. 578 (1966).
36. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
37. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
38. Comment, The Abstention Doctrine: Some Recent Developments 46 TUL. L. REV.
762 (1972).
39. See Gere v. Stanley, 453 F.2d 205 (1971) (held that a Pennsylvania statute authoriz-
ing plaintiff's suspension from public school clearly created a federal question concerning
the fourteenth amendment, and thus refused to abstain). In Zwickler v. Koota 389 U.S.
241 (1967), the Court refused to abstain, showing concern for the duty of the federal court
to respect the suitor's choice. of the federal forum in which to bring his federal constitu-
tional claims, and held that it is no reason to abstain merely because state courts are
equally responsible for the protection of constitutional rights.
40. See King-Smith v. Aaron, 455 F.2d 378 (3d Cir. 1972) (concerning the right of a
blind woman to teach in the Pittsburgh public school system-allegations of violation of
the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment were made.)
The court refused to abstain, finding the statute in question to be clear, although it
recognized that the state has a paramount interest in the operation of its educational sys-
tem. The court reasoned that Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), laid down the
policy that federal courts should not "... intervene in the resolution of conflicts which
arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply impli-
cate basic constitutional values," 445 F.2d at 380 n.3. The reasonableness of the school
board's decision not to allow the plaintiff to teach in the Pittsburgh public school system
in light of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment
was the only issue presented. The court found that federal couirts are the primary forum
105
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 12: 100, 1973
stain when important federal rights are involved in the litigation.41
Further, the Court has declined to abstain where the delay inherent in
sending a case back to the state court will unduly impair a federal
right.42 However, the Court has abstained when a cause of action has
been asserted under the civil rights statutes and the state law is un-
clear.43 Recently the Court has retreated from its decision not to abstain
in which such issues are to be resolved and that the Epperson policy by itself was not
sufficient to warrant abstention. Id.
41. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). A class action was brought by members of
the faculty, staff and student body of the University of Washington asking that an oath
which was to be taken as a condition of employment be declared unconstitutionally vague
in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. The Court felt that construction of
the oath's provisions by the state courts would not alter the constitutional issue for the
oath was susceptible to an indefinite number of interpretations. It was also found that
abstract construction of the oath in state courts without reference to concrete situations
would most likely create other constitutional issues for decision which is a result contrary
to the purpose of abstention. The Court also emphasized that it wanted to refrain from
lengthy, piecemeal adjudication fearing that ". . . the free dissemination of ideas may be
the loser .... " which deters conduct that is protected by the Constitution. Id. at 375-79.
In Zwichler, the appellant sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal district
court on the ground that a New York statute prohibiting the distribution of certain
handbills containing statements in connection with the election of public officers was
repugnant to the guarantees of the first amendment of the Constitution. It was found that
statutory construction by the state courts would not avoid or modify the constitutional
question for the statute was challenged for its overbreadth, and the Court refused to
abstain. 389 U.S. at 254. It is noteworthy that during the course of its opinion the Court
stated:
We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal Courts sit, human rights under the
Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication, and that we have
not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights
asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum.
Id. at 248.
42. Hostettler v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964) (held that
although the twenty-first amendment grants the state the power to regulate domestic
transportation of intoxicants, the commerce clause denies power to the states to prevent
federally supervised transactions involving intoxicants for delivery to consumers in foreign
nations). Abstention was refused for the fact that the litigation had already been long
delayed and that further delay was unwarranted. The Court also found that neither party
had requested abstention and that there was no danger of disrupting a state legislative
scheme of regulation. Id. at 328-29.
In Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), the Court felt that the long delay
in enforcing the constitutional rights found to be denied in the Court's decision in Brown
v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and the additional delay of remanding the case to the
state courts would further impair petitioners' rights. 377 U.S. at 229.
In Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965), it was found that a class action attacking
the validity of a state statutory scheme as impairing the right vote in violation of the
twenty-fourth amendment alleged the infringement of a fundamental right. The motion
was heard in the district court eight months before the 1964 general elections, thus the
Court held that given the importance and immediacy of the problem and the delay inher-
ent in referring questions of state law to state courts, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in deciding not to abstain. Id. at 537.
43. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (suit was originally brought in federal
district court for a declaratory judgment asking that five state statutes which had never
been construed by the state courts be declared unconstitutional and asking that their
enforcement be enjoined). Action was predicated upon 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970),
alleging violations of the fourteeenth amendment. The Court held that the district court
should have abstained from deciding the merits of the issues and should have retained
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concerning the issuance of injunctive relief when a state criminal
prosecution threatens first amendment freedoms. 44
Considering the above principles and the unique features of the in-
stant case, it is submitted that the district court's decision to reject
Lancaster-Lebanon's contention that abstention was appropriate was
solidly within the confines of stare decisis and that the court's discre-
tion was prudently exercised.
The traditional reasons for exercising the power to abstain were
non-existent in this case. Pullman established the notion that absten-
tion is desirable to avoid unnecessary or premature constitutional
adjudication. Clearly there was no such danger in the present case for
the settlements entered into among the parties eliminated the need to
make any constitutional decision. There was also little threat of undue
friction between the Commonwealth and the federal judiciary as the
officers responsible for the educational system 45 requested that the
court retain jurisdiction.
It is important to note that previous Supreme Court decisions have
shown that abstention may not be appropriate when: (1) there are
fundamental federal rights at stake, 40 and (2) when the delay inherent
in sending the case back to state courts for decision may impair such
rights. 47 Although the district court did not rely upon these decisions
expressly, it is interesting that in its analysis of the equitable consid-
erations against abstaining, the court appeared to recognize the import-
ance of these considerations.
The district court recognized that much time and energy had been
expended and that the rudiments of the plan contemplated had been
implemented. The court further recognized that such a plan would
make possible a life of dignity and meaning for members of the plain-
tiff class. For these reasons, including the further reason that the in-
jurisdiction until the Virginia courts had a reasonable opportunity to construe the state's
statutes that were alleged to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 176-77.
44. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (held that the Court would not abstain
where statutes are justifiably attacked on their faces as abridging free expression because
of the "chilling effect" of threatened prosecutions under state criminal statutes). Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), subsequently held that the Court would abstain from issuing
an injunction to restrain state action upon a pending prosecution under California statute,
although first and fourteenth amendment grounds were the basis of the petitioner's claim.
See Comment, The Abstention Doctrine: Some Recent Developments, 46 TUL. L. REv. 762
(1972).
45. See note 19 supra.
46. See note 40 supra.
47. See note 41 supra. Generally, when this criterion has been employed, other reasons
for abstention have also been present.
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terests of comity were served by the Commonwealth's full participa-
tion in the consent agreement, it was felt that the use of the court's
discretion to abstain would not be appropriate at such an advanced
stage of litigation.48
Clearly the court was correct in its analysis. All parties to the action
were concerned with the welfare of the plaintiff class and even Lan-
caster-Lebanon did not contest the fairness of the agreement. There-
fore, the considerations of undue delay coupled with the Common-
wealth's apparent interest in implementing the agreements weighed
heavily against remanding the case to the state court for interpretation
of the law of the Commonwealth.
Furthermore, the fundamental right of equal opportunity to an edu-
cation was asserted 49 and the delay inherent in sending the case back
to the Commonwealth may have been costly concerning the ability of
retarded children to benefit from the educational experience. 50 Such
considerations buttress the soundness of the decision not to abstain,
particularly in view of the Supreme Court's prior decisions concerning
the protection of fundamental rights. This is especially true when other
reasons for declining to abstain are also present.
After consideration of all of the above factors, it becomes apparent
that the court's decision not to abstain was one that recognized the in-
terests which lie at the roots of the doctrine and that the interests of
federalism and comity did not require abstention in the situation that
confronted the court.
-Gary N. Moskovitz
48. 343 F. Supp. at 300.
49. Plaintiffs asserted that once the right to public education is granted to all children
by the constitution and laws of the Commonwealth the deprivation of that right infringes
upon the fundamental right of an equal opportunity to an education and therefore a
compelling state interest mut be shown in order to exclude retarded children. In support
of their proposition, plaintiffs offered Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), whichdeclared the principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional.
The district court 'found it need not decide the issue, for the planitiffs established acolorable claim nder the less stringent rational basis test. 343 F. Sup . at 283 n.8.
50. Farrell, Preprimary and Primary Special Classes for the Educable Retardate, in
SPECIAL EDUCATION 48 (E. Stark ed. 1969). The pre-primary and primary class for children
who are considered educable retardates (I.Q. 50-75) is discussed. Concern is shown for the
necessity of obtaining an education at an early level for such a child, so that an oppor-
tunity for maturation through self-help may be realized.
Recognition of the fundamental nature of the right of the plaintiff class to an equal
opportunity to obtain an education and of the necessity of procuring an education at an
early stage so that the opportunity may be fully utilized, it is submitted, compels the
conclusion that the delay inherent in abstention would have at least damaged the ability
to profit from an education and would thereby dilute the federally protected right.
108
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